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Abstract
This paper empirically compares the contribution of the two major wealth accumulation
factors – earned income and inheritances – to the net wealth position of households in the
Eurozone. The elasticities of both wealth sources differ considerably across countries and are
overly non-linear. Depending on the position in the wealth distribution, an increase of one
percentile in the income distribution corresponds to 0:1-0:6 percentiles in the net wealth dis-
tribution. We find substantially stronger effects for inheritances vis-á-vis income. In Greece,
Portugal, and Austria, households have to climb around three percentiles in the income distri-
bution to compensate a one percentile increase in the inheritance distribution. The findings
clearly suggest that bequests play a stronger role in wealth accumulation than earned income.
Keywords: Wealth distribution, household structure
JEL Classification: C21, D31
1 Introduction
In his path-breaking book “Capital in the Twenty-First Century”, Piketty (2014) recites Balzac’s
novel Le Père Goriot and its penniless main character Eugéne de Rastignac, who is pondering
how to become affluent. His shady companion Vautrin explains unmistakably that hard work
is not paying off and marrying rich is the key. While this anecdote mirrors the social relations
in the early nineteenth century in France, the quantitative importance of inherited wealth to the
*Financial support by the Austrian Chamber of Labour (Vienna & Lower Austria) is gratefully acknowledged. We
thank Wilfried Altzinger, Thomas Piketty, Alyssa Schneebaum and Daniel Waldenström for helpful comments
and suggestions. Furthermore, the research assistance and comments of Michael Ertl are gratefully acknowledged.
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accumulation of life-cycle wealth has also been intensively discussed in past decades (Kotlikoff and
Summers, 1981; Modigliani, 1988; Kotlikoff, 1988; Kessler and Masson, 1989; Gale and Scholz,
1994; Piketty et al., 2014). In essence, the question is whether bequests or self-made income
facilitate social advancement to the top in the wealth distribution.
In modern western societies the opinion prevails that the willingness to work hard paves the
way for material well-being and upward social mobility. In contrast, the role of inter vivos gifts
and bequests for wealth accumulation is a controversial topic in the political discourse and also
in social sciences. Empirical evidence shows that limited social mobility is strongly connected
to wealth transfers between generations and there is a manifest nexus between social mobility
and actual economic inequality (Corak, 2013; Clark and Cummins, 2015). This line of argument
concludes that current inequalities in income and wealth transform into unequal intergenerational
wealth transfers and consequently lead to constrained social mobility. In the same vein, recent re-
search shows that inheritances add a substantial source of wealth heterogeneity among households
even with similar lifetime earnings (De Nardi and Yang, 2014). However, there is also recent evi-
dence from Scandinavian countries, which suggests that inheritances might reduce overall wealth
inequality, although absolute values of inherited wealth are strongly correlated with pre-bequest
wealth of heirs. This is due to the greater relative importance of bequests in lower parts of the
distribution (Adermon et al., 2015; Elinder et al., 2015; Boserup et al., forthcoming 2016).
The role of wealth transfers becomes all the more important given the substantial rise in wealth
concentration over the last decades (Piketty and Zucman, 2014; Saez and Zucman, 2016). Ris-
ing wealth inequality appears to correspond with imbalances of economic power, social privileges
and influences on political decision processes to maintain social inequalities (Rehm and Schnet-
zer, 2015). Thus, the link between a skewed distribution of intergenerational wealth transfers and
wealth concentration may entail considerable disparities in social, economic and political opportu-
nities. The literature provides inconclusive results whether earnings or inheritances have a greater
effect on wealth inequality since it varies from country to country (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein,
2013; Arrondel et al., 2014). A closer look on the Eurozone countries shows that dispersion in
bequests and inter vivos transfers have a stronger impact on wealth inequality than income differ-
ences (Leitner, 2016). Thus, the contributions to wealth accumulation from bequests or earnings
is decisive for social cohesion and perceptions of fairness.
Households mainly acquire wealth from two sources: earned income (wages and earnings from
self-employment) and inheritances (Gale and Scholz, 1994; Piketty et al., 2014). Both income
channels allow for an increase in the relative wealth position conditional on the size of either
component and the underlying circumstances of wealth accumulation. The former condition is
trivial in its nature but subject to a number of constraints which may influence the magnitude of
the contribution to net worth. These circumstances include a variety of socio-economic parameters,
reaching from the arrangement of tax and welfare systems to cultural aspects shaping consumption
and savings patterns (Fessler and Schürz, 2015). In addition to this aspect, earnings uncertainty
may also have a significant impact upon the savings pattern over the lifecycle (Irvine and Wang,
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2001).
Analyzing transfer wealth entails the challenge of conceptually defining transfers versus self-
made wealth, which also caused a lively debate between Kotlikoff (1988) and Modigliani (1988).
There is no consensus on whether returns to inherited wealth are counted as transfer wealth or
as life-cycle wealth. In addition, inheritances and inter vivos gifts normally do not cover implicit
gifts like appointing an offspring as an equal partner in a lucrative family business or paying the
costs for college education. Moreover, meeting the costs of food and clothing for dependents is
not considered a gift but as provisioning for the family.
In this paper, we pursue an econometric approach to assess the relative role of bequests and
income for private household wealth. With harmonized survey data, we calculate cross-country
estimates for the impact of inheritances on the likelihood of being at the top of the Eurozone wealth
distribution. Similar calculations have been carried out by Fessler and Schürz (2015), however,
merely by means of OLS estimations. We extend existing research using quantile regressions to
calculate non-linear elasticities between the distribution of earned income (wages and earnings
from self-employment) and inheritances, and the distribution of net household wealth. Section 2
therefore provides our methodological approach of multivariate quantile regressions. In section 3,
we describe the survey data and address considerations concerning cross-country comparability
of wealth data. We then present the results in section 4. First, we show how country shares in
the Eurozone top wealth percentiles are associated with the receipt of bequests. Thereafter, the
results of the quantile regressions allow to compare the influence of income versus inheritances on
climbing in the net wealth distribution. Finally, section 5 draws some concluding remarks.
2 Methodological Approach: Quantile Regression
Linear regressions are useful to gain first insights into the data and the relationships between
variables. Especially with wealth and income data these are, however, only rough approximations
to the truth. This is due to the fact that the conditional mean is a bad approximation for very
skewed distributions such as for wealth and income. One method commonly applied to model
such responses is quantile regression, which was originally used as a robust method of estimation
when the normality assumption was not strictly satisfied. This will especially be the case if
unobservable constituents (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) influence the conditional distribution of
the variable regressed on. In wealth regressions, this can be considered a severe problem, since the
additional information included in micro datasets is often limited. This is true for, e.g., abstract
concepts like power-relations, which arguably vary along the distribution and are hardly captured
by additional regressors.
Quantile regression limits the influence of these effects since it regresses on the mean but con-
ditionally on a given quantile, so that outliers have little effect on the estimate. In the context
of wealth analyses, we apply this method to regress certain individual- and household-level char-
acteristics on quantiles of the net wealth cumulative distribution function (CDF). Let Y be a
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random variable with the cumulative distribution function,
F (y) = P (Y  y)
then we can write the quantile function for a quantile  2 [0; 1] as an inverse function,
Q() = F 1() = inf(y : F (y)  ):
As proposed by Koenker and Bassett (1978), the th quantile of such a random sample fy1; y2; :::; yng
can be calculated as
min
2<
nX
i=1
 (yi   ) (1)
where  () is a so-called check function. This function is based on the absolute deviations of
the residuals jyi  j which are weighted by  if the term is positive and by (1  ) if it is negative.
Hence  =   I(yi > ) + (1   )  I(yi < ). Analogue to the estimation of the unconditional
mean for a random sample which minimizes the sum of squared residuals, this applies to the linear
conditional mean function E(Y jX = x) = x0 by solving
^ = arg min
2<p
nX
i=1
(yi   x0i)2: (2)
Given the linear conditional quantile function Q( jX = x) = x0i(), we estimate
^() = arg min
2<p
nX
i=1
 (yi   x0i): (3)
This implies that the estimator is a general case of Least Absolute Deviations estimator (LAD),
which regresses on the median, shifted by a factor  .
3 The Household Finance and Consumption Survey
Research on wealth inequality in the Eurozone has gained momentum with the first wave of the
Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) which was conducted in 2010. The rich
data set covers 15 countries in the euro area and provides information on the balance sheets
of private households. The total sample includes 62; 521 representative observations which are
(methodically) comparable across countries. Additionally to a broad range of household financial
variables, the data set also provides socio-economic information on an individual level such as
income, social status, age, and education. Detailed information on the complex survey design
and the data collection process can be found in Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption
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Network (2013).
While this data source provides a unique opportunity for research on wealth inequality and
inheritances in the euro area, two major shortcomings need to be addressed in cross-country com-
parisons. First, variations in total wealth and its structure may be subject to differing institutional
arrangements in each country. Social norms, welfare regimes, and the public provision of goods
may influence the necessity for households to accumulate wealth. This issue is especially relevant
for the household structure which is known to differ notably between continental and southern
European countries (Fessler and Schürz, 2013). Second, different sampling strategies in the par-
ticipating countries may lead to varying degrees of coverage, especially of high-wealth individuals.
While this issue can be addressed through over-sampling of this particular group, such a strategy
is not feasible for every country: there is no over-sampling for Austria, Malta, the Netherlands,
Slovakia and Slovenia in the HFCS data. Therefore, the gap between the top in the actual wealth
distribution and its representation in the survey may vary significantly by country (Tiefensee and
Grabka, 2014).
The latter issue has been addressed in Vermeulen (2014) and can in general be mitigated by
using imputation methods. For this study such an approach is, however, not feasible. While
household wealth can be imputed using Pareto methods (Eckerstorfer et al., 2015; Bach et al.,
2015), we would also need to consider a number of other household variables and individual
characteristics that cannot be easily assigned. A sensible imputation approach would therefore
need to impute all these variables in a multivariate way which is not the focus of this paper.
The HFCS provides total annual gross income for households. We make use of the household
earned income which includes remuneration of employees, self-employment incomes, and income
from pensions. Inheritances and substantial gifts are already collected on the household level in
the HFCS. This variable captures the monetary value of all inheritances and gifts ever received
by the household members, including money, dwellings, land, business, life insurances, and other
valuables. It is worth noting that we do not account for implicit gifts as mentioned above (Kotlikoff,
1988). Transfer wealth should thus be regarded as seriously downward biased. For the analysis of
the wealth distribution, we use total household net wealth (gross wealth less liabilities), including
tangibles (main residence, vehicles, company stakes, etc.) and financial assets (savings, bonds,
shares, etc.).
Since wealth data is subject to differential non-response (Vermeulen, 2014), the HFCS makes
use of multiple imputations. The imputation of missing valid information on household wealth
closely follows the guidelines provided by Little and Rubin (2002). To account for the inherent
uncertainty of the imputation procedure, five values are chosen to replace the missing information,
based on different random draws from the joint distribution of the collected data. Thereby, it is
possible to partly reflect the uncertainty of the imputation process. All figures and calculations
reported in this paper were derived with the use of 100 complex survey weights, all five multiple
imputations, and the application of Rubin’s rule.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Net wealth Explanatories
P05 P50 P95 Income Bequests Female Age Tert. edu. Retiree Entrep.
ke ke ke  (ke ) %  (ke ) %  % % %
AT -0.5 76.4 934.2 39.3 35.4 268.5 55.8 51.0 13.6 35.5 9.4
BE 0.3 206.7 1077.0 43.1 35.1 253.8 46.4 52.2 37.8 32.5 4.6
DE -1.9 51.3 657.4 37.5 33.9 254.3 49.0 51.9 29.2 29.7 6.8
ES 0.2 182.5 878.3 27.5 30.4 356.2 49.4 52.7 25.7 20.7 8.3
FR 0.4 115.7 777.9 29.5 39.8 263.3 39.2 52.1 23.4 34.2 7.9
GR 0.0 102.0 471.1 26.4 30.5 95.4 59.3 49.9 20.3 27.9 14.8
NL -36.1 103.1 579.8 40.6 8.4 107.7 36.7 51.9 33.6 21.3 3.9
PT 0.0 75.1 481.6 18.6 29.5 74.4 29.7 55.1 9.1 36.2 10.4
SI 0.2 99.6 432.2 20.9 40.2 186.6 58.2 51.2 22.5 40.6 3.5
SK 1.8 61.1 207.8 13.0 38.3 45.5 55.4 48.1 16.3 26.1 7.3
This table shows descriptive statistics of our dependent variable, ie. selected percentiles of net household wealth, and of our
explanatory variables, ie. mean of households earned income, proportion of heir households, mean of received inheritances
(capitalized with 3%), and several socioeconomic characteristics of the reference person (gender, age, education, labor
status). Source: HFCS 2010, own calculations.
For this study, we utilize the whole data set excluding observations for Cyprus, Finland, Italy,
Luxembourg, and Malta. These countries were either lacking information on the sex or age of
household members apart from the reference person (CY and MT), did not provide data on
intergenerational wealth transfers (FI & IT), or only offer anonymized information for a large
number of observations (i.e, missing information on gender of additional household members for
LU). Since this information is indispensable for our method to correct for differing household
structures, these five countries were not included in our analysis. This leaves us with a reduced
sample of 41; 501 household observations from Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Greece,
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia, which represent roughly 80% (111; 325; 857) of
European households.
It has been argued that cross-country comparability of wealth data may be limited when survey
designs differ between countries (Tiefensee and Grabka, 2014) or when the institutional setting
influences population and household structures (Bover, 2010; Fessler and Schürz, 2013). An
innovative approach to control for varying household structures has been presented in Fessler et
al. (2014). The authors argue that per-country household wealth should be standardized using a
counterfactual distribution based on the overall frequency of a single household type in the survey.
This correction therefore purges wealth differences that arise from differing household structure.
Our analysis adapts the proposed methodology and corrects the HFCS data for common household
types with up to four members each. A sensitivity analysis reveals that this is a reasonable value,
since it allows a large enough number of different households as controls on the one hand, but
does not use very sparse types for the correction on the other hand.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the countries and variables in use. First of all, the
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differences in the median wealth across the Eurozone countries are remarkable. While median net
wealth in Germany amounts to slightly above e 50,000, it is roughly e 180,000 in Spain. However,
the survey period in Spain was around 2008 when the real estate bubble boosted residential
wealth, while most other countries started gathering data in 2010. There are also large differences
in the average household income from employment and pensions. Slovakia exhibits the smallest
value with an annual income of e 13,000 while Belgium displays the highest income (e 43,100).
Concerning the share of households that have already inherited, the participation rates range
between 29.5% in Portugal and 40.2% in Slovenia. The Netherlands seems to be an outlier with an
exceptionally low rate of heirs (8.4%). It is worth noting that the Netherlands is the only country
in the HFCS survey that conducted computer-assisted web interviews (CAWI) instead of personal
interviews. This could explain part of the significant differences compared to the other countries,
since information on private wealth collected with personal interviews is supposed to be more
reliable than web inquiries. For instance, interviewers may persuade respondents to participate in
the survey, increase response rates, and reduce the risk of response bias (Eurosystem Household
Finance and Consumption Network, 2013). As already mentioned, the remaining socio-economic
variables are based on the information of the reference persons.
As we are interested in the processes behind climbing the ladder to the top of the wealth dis-
tribution, we examine the households in the top percentiles by country in Figure 1. A priori,
one would expect countries to be represented in the top wealth shares according to their pop-
ulation weights. Accordingly, a country with a population share of 20% in the total Eurozone
population should also represent 20% in the top wealth shares. This is, however, not the case for
the Eurozone, as Figure 1a depicts. Based on the roughly 111 million households in our sample,
this figure displays the country-specific composition of the 11.1 million households in the Top
10% of the Eurozone net wealth distribution. The black bars show the hypothetical proportion
of countries that is solely based on their population share, while the dark grey bars represent
their actual shares in the high-wealth households. This simple illustration shows that conditional
on the country of origin, rich countries like Germany seem to be underrepresented in the Top
10% (compared to their actual population share), while others are overrepresented (like Belgium,
France, Spain). As mentioned before, this does not account for a number of factors which may
influence cross-country comparisons, the most important being household structure. We correct
for household heterogeneity by calibrating the survey weights, so that the households of each
country are reweighted to represent the average household composition in the sample, which leads
to the results displayed by the light grey bars. Compared to the actual scenario, the reweighting
procedure results in substantial changes, especially for countries whose household structure is far
off from the sample average. This is especially evident for Spain, and to a lesser extent also for
Germany and France, whose respective household compositions seem to be very different from the
sample average.
Figures 1b to 1d provide the same illustration for even higher top wealth shares. Comparing
these figures, the most remarkable trend is probably given by Germany. As mentioned, the largest
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Eurozone country is underrepresented by one tenth of its population in the Top 10%, but this is
also true for the Top 5% even when accounting for differences in the household composition. The
picture changes, when looking at the the Top 1% where Germany is overrepresented by a factor
of 1:2, and particularly for the Top 0.1% where German households have a 35% higher occurrence
compared to what their population share would imply.
A mirrored image of this process can be observed for Spain and France which are overrepre-
sented by a factor of 1:22 and 1:12 in the Top 10% respectively (after reweighting). This gap
diminishes in the Top 1%, where France is represented closely around its population share and
Spain is already down 12% of the equal-occurrence scenario. Many smaller countries — Greece,
Netherlands, Slovenia, Slovakia — disappear altogether starting from Top 1%. The results for
Austria are striking, insofar as the catching-up process along this analysis is the most drastic.
Already overrepresented in the Top 10% by a factor of 1:22, the share increases significantly to
reach a factor of 2:4 in the Top 1% and an even higher value of 3:2 for the Top 0.1% compared to
the Austrian population share in the Eurozone.
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Figure 1: Country Representation: Population, Actual and Reweighted Share
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4 Results
Our empirical application focuses on the propensity to get rich through the two main drivers
of wealth accumulation: self-made income and inheritances. We have particular interest in the
country-specific differences of the marginal contributions to household wealth in the Eurozone.
Such differences could be motivated by a number of institutional settings, for example differing
tax levels on both income sources or labor market characteristics and housing preferences which
may facilitate saving and thus wealth accumulation.
As the above-mentioned literature has shown, inheritances can be a significant component of
wealth accrual. Our empirical strategy will therefore rest on two pillars. First, we estimate logit
regressions using country fixed-effects and dummies which indicate whether a household has re-
ceived inheritances. This allows us to depict the overall importance of inheritances, for now leaving
aside the issue that regressions on the mean may be a bad approximation to the overall distri-
bution of net wealth. Second, we expand our regression design and estimate structural quantile
regressions. These are conducted separately for each country with further control variables for
other household characteristics. This method especially emphasizes the differing role of income
and inheritances at various points of the distribution.
4.1 Disproportionately Rich: Logit Evidence
Using logit regressions we estimate a model of the form
ItopX = 0 + 1Country+ 2Bequest>0 ; (4)
where an indicator variable ItopX, which takes on the value of zero and one if a household
belongs to the Top X% of the Eurozone’s wealth distribution, is related to country dummies and
an indicator that captures whether the household has received an inheritance. Based on these
outcomes we derive the estimated share of households in the Top X% as predictions based on our
logit regression and compare it to an equal representation of all countries at the top end of the
wealth distribution.
Figure 2 presents the results for this exercise for the Top 10%, Top 5% and Top 1% of the
Eurozone net wealth distribution. The black line of unity marks the position where the number of
households in the top shares corresponds exactly to a country’s population share in the Eurozone.
Values above the black line denote overrepresentation while values below the black line display
countries which are underrepresented in the top wealth shares. Stars indicate the actual estimated
proportion, unconditional on having received an inheritance. For example, Germany is slightly
underrepresented in the Top 10% (left panel), with an estimated value of 0:9 times its population
share. Even in the Top 5%, there are still less German households than we would expect due to
the population share, however the picture changes for the Top 1%, where German households are
overrepresented.
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These results of the logit estimation correspond to the light grey bars in Figure 1. Many
countries are underrepresented – Greece, Netherlands, Portugal – or even represented not at all
the further we move up the distributional ladder. Almost no Greek and Slovenian households are
among the top wealthy, and there is not a single Slovakian household in the Top 1% share.
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Figure 2: Logit Regression with Country and Inheritance Effects
To better understand the processes at work here, we further include a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether a household has inherited. Again, the findings are reported in Figure 2. Triangles
depict the share of households that have inherited and circles indicate the proportion of non-heir
households. A first observation follows from the descriptive statistics in Table 1: only a minority
of households have already inherited at the time of the survey interview, so that the uncondi-
tional estimate is closer to the estimate for non-heir households for most countries. Furthermore,
the results indicate that inheritances significantly improve a household’s position in the wealth
distribution. While households from Austria, Germany, Spain, and France are on average not
or only slightly overrepresented in the Top 10%, this picture drastically changes for heir house-
holds. In most of these cases, the unconditional effect is a mixture of non-heir households which
seem to appear more sparsely than an equal share would suggest, and heir households that are
overrepresented by factors of two to three.
Additionally, this picture intensifies the further we move up in the distribution. Austrian
households, which are the most dramatic case, increase in overrepresentation along the three top
wealth shares. However, this effect is mainly driven by heir households with factors ranging from
2 to 4 when moving from the top decile to the top percentile. A similar point can be made
for other countries such as Belgium, Germany, Spain, and France. Interestingly, Portuguese heir
households can be found to be exactly their population share in the Top 1%, while their non-heir
counterparts are consistently underrepresented.
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4.2 Getting Rich, Percentile by Percentile
The results presented above provide useful insights into the effects of inheritances on the propensity
of a household to be among the richest European households. An in-depth analysis of the factors
that lead to a higher position in the net wealth distribution takes a more holistic view on the
topic. For this reason, we explicitly model the whole distribution in order to consider varying
effects of income, bequests, and other covariates along the distribution. Previous studies have
shown that such an approach needs to incorporate the non-linear nature of wealth data in the
modelling procedure (Humer et al., 2015).
In this setup, we utilize quantile regressions and estimate two equations of the form,
CDFnetwealth = 0 + 1Bequest+ 2CDFIncome + 3Gender+ 4Age+ 5Age2
+ 5Tertiary Education+ 7Retiree+ 8Entrepreneur+ "
(5)
with
Bequest =
( DummyBequest (5a)
CDFBequest (5b)
We are primarily interested in the effect of bequests and self-made income on a household’s
position in the net wealth distribution, measured by the coefficients 1 and 2. With regard to
inheritances, we estimate one specification with a dummy variable for the receipt of bequests
(equation 5a) and one with the household’s position in the distribution of bequests (equation 5b).
The latter is based on the capitalized value of inheritances assuming a fixed interest rate of 3%
per annum. As a sensitivity check, we also varied the rate between 1% and 5% without causing
substantial changes to our findings. These results are available upon request. Furthermore, both
specifications control for a number of standard socio-economic characteristics for each household,
which may affect the wealth position apart from income and inheritances. Since socio-economic
variables are collected on an individual level in the HFCS, we assign the values of the survey
reference persons to the households. These are gender, age, and tertiary education. We further
include a quadratic age effect to test the permanent income hypothesis. Finally, our specification
tries to capture two very distinct groups in the data, retirees and entrepreneurs. Since the spe-
cific coefficient estimates of these controls are not at the center of our analysis, we refrain from
interpreting them in detail and refer the interested reader to tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix.
In short, conditionally on being statistically significant all estimates match the expected sign.
The estimation procedure follows a split-sample approach where we estimate individual regres-
sions for each country. This approach facilitates the comparison of coefficients between countries,
since we avoid the need for purchasing-power corrections for wealth, income or inheritances and
11
instead only rely on the internal (within-country) consistency of these variables. Furthermore,
the focus on the CDF position for wealth, income and inheritances simplifies the interpretation of
results, especially when addressing the relation of these factors to each other. Following the em-
pirical literature, we exclude the bottom and top 1% to make our analysis more robust (Koenker,
2005).
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Figure 3: Quantile Regression: Income CDF and Bequest Dummy
Figure 3 illustrates the parameters of interest of specification 5a, ie. the income CDF and
the inheritance dummy across the distribution for all countries in our sample. Table A.1 in the
Appendix provides the regression results for all variables for the baseline OLS estimation and
selected quantiles of the quantile regression approach. With regard to the income distribution,
the rise of one percentile in the income distribution is associated with OLS estimates of mostly
around 0:4 percentiles in the wealth CDF (with the exception of the Netherlands), which is similar
to the results of Fessler and Schürz (2015). The quantile regression approach reveals gains between
0:1 and 0:6 percentiles in the net wealth distribution. We observe an inverted “U” shape pattern
which is consistent in all countries, however, the position and the shape of the “U” vary. This
shape indicates that earned income contributes most to wealth accumulation in the broad middle
of the net wealth distribution.
The results in Table A.1 reveal that the maximum contribution of income to the wealth position
is reached in different quantiles across countries. While some countries, like Germany, Austria,
Portugal or Slovenia reach the maximum around the median, we also find clearly diverging pat-
terns. A group of countries, namely the Netherlands, France, and Spain peaks around the bottom
quartile of the distribution, so that income gains in the lower part of the distribution are con-
nected with the highest gains in net wealth (in terms of the CDF). Contrary to this picture, some
countries reach their highest contribution in the upper half of the distribution. Notably Greece
and Slovakia approach the highest estimate of above 0:4 around the 75th percentile. Interestingly,
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the estimates for the Netherlands are consistently lower than for all other countries and partly
even insignificant.
Concerning the bequest dummy variable, the effect on the net wealth position of households is
considerably larger. The estimates almost reach values of a 25 percentile gain for heir households
in Greece and Austria. As can be seen, the influence of inheritances varies considerable between
countries and net wealth percentiles. For the bottom quartile, the effect of bequests ranges from
roughly 10 to 23 percentiles in the net wealth distribution, in the top quartile the spread is
5 to 15 percentiles. Austria displays the strongest positive coefficients for the upper 70% of the
distribution, thus receiving bequests is most beneficial for social advancement in Austria compared
to other Eurozone countries.
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Figure 4: Quantile Regression: Income CDF and Bequest CDF
Figure 4 presents results for specification 5b, where both income and bequests are included in
terms of their CDF. For better comparability, the scale of the ordinate in both panels correspond
in this graph. Again, the coefficients of the income CDF show the inverted “U” shape and are in
general robust across both specifications, as can be seen in Table A.2.
However, the effect of the inheritance CDF on the net wealth position shows a different pattern.
Overall we can note, that climbing one percentile in the distribution of inheritances contributes
significantly more to household wealth than gaining one percentile in the income CDF. At the
median, the coefficients for the income CDF range between 0:22 and 0:55, the significant esti-
mates for the bequest CDF vary between 0:55 and 1:16 percentiles in the net wealth distribution.
Furthermore, it can be observed that the estimated coefficients in almost all countries display a
decreasing trend, meaning that inheritances matter more at the bottom end of the net wealth
distribution. Some countries showing higher contributions of income are at the lower end of the
bequest estimates, like Slovenia and Spain. Others, like the Netherlands, Greece, Austria, and
Portugal, continuously outperform other countries with regard to the contribution of inheritances
13
to net wealth.
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Figure 5: Quantile Regression: Ratio of Bequest to Income CDF Percentile Gain
The nature of the regression specifications allows us to easily compare the estimates for income
and inheritances. The left panel of Figure 5 shows the relevance of inheritances as compared with
the earned income. The values in this figure indicate how many percentiles a household would have
to climb in the income CDF in order to compensate for the receipt of bequests. Greece exhibits the
most extreme numbers, particularly in the lower part of the wealth distribution: households at the
bottom would need to jump more than 200 percentiles in the income distribution to compensate
an inheritance (see also Table A.3). In most countries, the ratios level off at coefficient ratios of
well below 50 in the middle of the distribution. However, a value of 50 still means that a household
would need to move up half of the income distribution to make up for the receipt of a bequest.
In the right panel of Figure 5, we compare the coefficients of income and bequests both expressed
in terms of the CDF. Since both estimates return the change in net wealth quantiles given a
change in the CDF position, the relative representation provides insights into how many income
percentiles a household needs to compensate for a one percentile increase in the inheritance CDF.
The figure therefore gives the relative importance of income and inheritances in each country
based on a common measurement scale. A value of one would therefore mean that bequests and
earned income have an equally strong effect on the net wealth position, a value larger than one
again attributes more importance to inheritances.
Below the 75th percentile, these ratios show a declining trend in the relative importance of
inheritances versus earnings on a household’s position in the net wealth distribution for most
countries. Slightly above the net wealth median, higher inheritances can be more easily com-
pensated by higher incomes, since both have similar effects on the wealth CDF. However, as we
approach the top of distribution, the relative importance of bequests gains momentum again.
This is a major advantage of our methodological approach, as compared to the study of Fessler
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and Schürz (2015): Only by relaxing the assumption of parameter homogeneity across wealth
percentiles, we are able to identify these diverse trends in the relative importance of bequests and
income at different points in the wealth distribution.
In the lower part of the distribution, the countries with the highest ratios are the Netherlands
(which arguably may be treated as an outlier in the analysis), Greece and Portugal, followed by
Austria. In these countries the wealth position increase from inheritances is much stronger than
that of an improvement of the income position. This heterogeneity in the ratio decreases (with
the exception of the Netherlands) along the distribution, so that starting from the median there
are only small between-country differences. Summarizing, for most countries the ratio between
the inheritance CDF and the income CDF gains is well above one throughout the distribution.
However, there are two exceptions. For Slovakia the ratio approaches unity in the top decile, in
Slovenia the ratio is already below one in the 44th percentile, meaning that an increase in income
from employment is even more important than an increase in bequests. However, the Eastern
European countries have developed market-based economies only rather recently as compared to
other countries in the sample. Therefore, the very distinct accumulation patterns we find for these
countries have to be interpreted cautiously.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the role of inheritances and earned income for the accumulation of wealth in
the Eurozone. For a consistent analysis, HFCS data are adjusted for country-specific differences
in the household structure and we control for socio-economic idiosyncrasies in the estimations.
We use logit and quantile regression specifications to single out the effects of bequests and income
on the households’ relative position in the net wealth distribution. With regard to our results,
we are able to provide insights that address following questions: Which households are at the top
of the Eurozone wealth distribution? How do inheritances affect the probability of getting to the
top? What is the role of bequests and income from employment for wealth accumulation? How
do these processes differ between the Eurozone countries?
Answering these research questions, we find that households from Austria, Belgium, and Ger-
many are overrepresented in the top 1% of the Eurozone net wealth distribution according to their
actual population share. While Spain and France are roughly represented closely around their pop-
ulation shares, smaller countries like Greece, Slovenia, and Slovakia are practically non-existent
in the richest percentile. This implies that countries are by no means represented according to
their population share. And even if a country is not overrepresented as a whole, this is only true
on average but mostly not for heir households.
Furthermore, inheritances significantly increase the chance of ending up in the top wealth shares.
While some countries are already overrepresented at the top, heir households are even more so by
factors two to four. In the top 1%, Austrian heir households appear four times more often than
their population share would suggest. Similarly, heir households from Belgium, Germany, Spain,
15
and France are significantly overrepresented compared to their non-heir counterparts. These
results give a sense of the importance of bequests for wealth accumulation and the chances of
being admitted into the circle of the rich.
We extend existing research with the application of quantile regressions to investigate whether
the importance of income and inheritances differs along the wealth distribution. The results
suggest that inheritances play a different role for building up wealth in top percentiles compared
to the bottom of the distribution. While a gain of one percentile in the income distribution on
average means an increase of roughly 0.4 percentiles in the net wealth distribution across countries,
quantile regressions show the non-linear behaviour of this relation. Depending on the position in
the wealth distribution, the contribution of income ranges between 0:1 and 0:6 percentiles, whereas
receiving an inheritance means as much as a 20 percentile hike. Both income and inheritances
follow a inverted “U” shape pattern that differs in skewness and magnitude across countries.
We employ two measures for bequests, a dichotomous bequest indicator and the relative position
in the inheritance distribution, which may serve as robustness check. Our particular interest lies
in the relative importance of bequests and income from employment. By relating the contribution
estimates for income CDF and inheritances CDF to each other, we assess the relative importance
of both factors in each country. As it turns out, the differences between countries are manifest. In
Greece, Portugal, and Austria, households have to climb around three percentiles in the income
distribution to compensate a one percentile increase in the inheritance distribution. In Germany,
this value is 2:4. In Slovakia (1:5) and Slovenia (1:3) the estimations are much lower and in the
topmost quantiles, income from employment is even more important than bequests.
The findings of this paper emphasize the outstanding role of inheritances for the accumulation
of wealth and the positioning within the net wealth distribution of households. These results
correspond with other research focusing on the strong contribution of bequests to total wealth
inequality (Leitner, 2016).
Eurozone cross-country analyses have been made possible by the harmonized HFCS survey.
The unique opportunity to investigate wealth-related questions will be improved with the second
survey wave in 2016. Future research therefore may be able to check our cross-country results
for consistency over time. However, following Piketty (2014), inheritances will be even more
important than earned income for wealth accumulation in the future. This will also pose a major
challenge for economic policy, since self-made wealth is generally legitimized while transfer wealth
is often perceived as an obstacle for equality of opportunity.
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Appendix A: Quantile Regressions
Table A.1: Quantile Regression Coefficients — Bequest (Yes/No)
AT BE DE ES FR GR NL PT SI SK
Income (CDF)
OLS 0.37 0.37 0.48 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.15 0.34 0.43 0.36
P0.01 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.13 0.03
P0.05 0.23 0.25 0.36 0.37 0.28 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.22 0.12
P0.25 0.40 0.45 0.58 0.54 0.46 0.27 0.28 0.38 0.39 0.28
P0.50 0.43 0.43 0.58 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.22 0.44 0.48 0.42
P0.75 0.39 0.33 0.43 0.23 0.29 0.42 0.11 0.31 0.41 0.43
P0.95 0.22 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.17 0.04 0.11 0.12 0.17
P0.99 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.07
Bequest (Yes/No)
OLS 18.18 10.23 18.88 11.83 13.32 15.19 9.72 13.12 14.49 6.64
P0.01 0.67 4.91 3.63 9.89 4.66 15.16 -1.08 5.77 16.83 2.13
P0.05 11.78 9.60 17.00 14.19 12.75 20.96 4.53 14.03 15.23 5.58
P0.25 22.57 12.88 20.30 11.79 17.31 23.23 13.81 18.22 15.32 10.39
P0.50 21.69 11.97 17.52 9.50 15.43 18.08 8.53 13.91 11.45 12.15
P0.75 15.96 9.27 12.08 7.65 13.36 13.09 6.30 9.24 8.42 11.73
P0.95 10.78 3.21 3.85 2.13 5.48 5.66 2.81 4.03 4.16 2.57
P0.99 4.01 0.73 0.63 0.36 1.10 1.07 0.57 1.95 2.06 0.31
Age
OLS 1.39 1.98 0.34 2.27 1.47 1.61 2.22 1.59 1.56 1.85
P0.01 -0.12 0.57 -0.32 0.24 -0.07 -0.34 -0.32 0.01 2.56 0.14
P0.05 0.34 0.92 0.06 1.39 0.78 -0.29 0.90 0.58 1.20 0.45
P0.25 0.56 1.76 0.58 2.59 1.41 0.76 2.93 1.65 1.74 1.10
P0.50 1.14 2.34 0.40 2.53 1.79 1.35 2.69 1.93 0.31 2.19
P0.75 2.05 2.81 1.41 1.64 2.51 2.14 2.08 1.91 -0.01 1.76
P0.95 1.13 0.96 0.45 0.33 1.25 0.54 1.04 0.78 -0.20 -0.13
P0.99 0.34 0.25 0.01 0.03 0.30 0.04 0.35 0.12 0.18 -0.28
Age2
OLS -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
P0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00
P0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00
P0.25 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
P0.50 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
P0.75 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
P0.95 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
P0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female
OLS -3.26 -3.80 -0.25 1.70 -2.19 -1.00 -11.30 -6.28 -1.49 -1.15
P0.01 0.27 -2.57 -1.31 0.63 -0.07 -1.02 -0.87 -1.97 -1.92 0.34
P0.05 -1.53 -4.68 -3.89 -0.61 -1.19 -1.00 -2.06 -4.45 -1.45 0.05
P0.25 -2.22 -5.11 -0.83 -1.13 -3.08 -0.04 -10.26 -9.74 -3.24 1.01
P0.50 -2.50 -5.02 -1.17 0.38 -3.49 -0.61 -12.85 -6.89 2.19 -0.69
P0.75 -3.00 -1.45 0.06 -0.01 -2.13 -2.00 -8.99 -5.35 1.57 -2.02
P0.95 -1.39 -0.60 1.21 -0.37 -0.49 -2.42 -2.07 -1.38 -0.59 1.04
P0.99 0.25 0.04 0.33 -0.15 0.02 -1.10 -0.70 -0.62 -0.47 -0.87
Source: HFCS 2010, own calculations. The table shows the parameter estimates of OLS and quantile regressions at
the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentile. Estimates with an associated p–value below 0.01 are depicted in bold,
values below 0.05 in italics. Insignificant estimates (p–value above 0.05) are given in gray.
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Table A.1: (continued)
AT BE DE ES FR GR NL PT SI SK
Entrepreneur
OLS 19.43 13.99 9.55 12.06 22.63 8.73 7.01 13.37 25.10 6.44
P0.01 1.38 8.11 -0.42 6.45 12.73 -2.59 -0.33 5.45 24.14 2.85
P0.05 12.07 6.47 6.50 13.33 20.74 3.42 0.20 9.71 13.92 0.34
P0.25 16.60 13.97 8.22 12.75 22.72 9.76 7.72 14.65 8.42 1.51
P0.50 17.11 13.65 8.08 12.23 21.32 11.17 6.75 14.44 13.67 9.66
P0.75 14.80 15.10 8.41 9.74 20.50 6.92 9.93 13.61 26.31 6.44
P0.95 10.71 7.45 4.73 2.74 9.00 1.90 4.93 5.31 10.41 2.34
P0.99 2.89 1.10 1.16 0.33 2.18 1.16 2.34 2.28 3.00 -0.40
Tertiary Education
OLS -0.14 7.90 3.98 6.73 5.73 5.41 6.73 10.07 14.33 9.84
P0.01 0.11 4.20 -1.31 4.43 1.27 0.68 1.42 0.61 11.32 1.43
P0.05 2.13 7.37 2.30 11.35 8.32 2.16 4.63 10.76 13.37 1.40
P0.25 0.87 7.07 3.06 14.57 6.38 3.24 9.31 19.20 19.87 8.25
P0.50 1.17 7.35 2.26 10.85 5.48 7.04 7.72 13.31 15.19 12.77
P0.75 -1.70 5.56 1.88 7.40 4.43 6.35 6.45 9.91 9.34 10.62
P0.95 -1.59 2.65 1.57 1.96 3.33 3.03 3.01 5.92 5.14 3.41
P0.99 1.70 0.61 0.59 0.38 1.11 1.21 1.34 1.54 3.84 1.10
Retiree
OLS 1.63 6.73 3.45 2.61 5.15 4.47 -4.62 0.32 20.36 -3.22
P0.01 -0.09 1.32 3.87 -0.10 0.55 -0.62 -1.52 -1.21 10.11 -0.37
P0.05 1.39 7.13 7.81 -1.75 0.98 -0.92 -0.49 0.73 11.29 0.20
P0.25 2.18 14.37 3.28 3.97 8.70 3.84 2.34 -1.54 14.63 -12.04
P0.50 3.87 6.11 4.44 3.50 6.25 7.03 -3.06 1.91 18.63 -1.77
P0.75 1.16 2.51 4.74 1.78 2.15 1.98 -1.28 1.69 2.90 1.78
P0.95 0.65 2.15 1.32 0.13 0.61 -0.47 -0.59 -1.15 -0.21 -2.99
P0.99 0.28 2.15 0.24 0.05 0.09 -1.52 0.62 -1.19 -1.24 -3.42
Source: HFCS 2010, own calculations. The table shows the parameter estimates of OLS and quantile regressions at
the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentile. Estimates with an associated p–value below 0.01 are depicted in bold,
values below 0.05 in italics. Insignificant estimates (p–value above 0.05) are given in gray.
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Table A.2: Quantile Regression Coefficients — Bequest (CDF)
AT BE DE ES FR GR NL PT SI SK
Income (CDF)
OLS 0.35 0.37 0.45 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.15 0.34 0.42 0.36
P0.01 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.03
P0.05 0.19 0.23 0.30 0.34 0.25 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.34 0.11
P0.25 0.36 0.44 0.51 0.49 0.42 0.23 0.27 0.37 0.44 0.25
P0.50 0.39 0.43 0.55 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.22 0.43 0.43 0.38
P0.75 0.37 0.31 0.43 0.22 0.28 0.42 0.11 0.30 0.42 0.44
P0.95 0.25 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.19
P0.99 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.08
Bequest (CDF)
OLS 0.99 0.67 1.09 0.85 0.68 1.05 1.93 0.99 0.56 0.53
P0.01 0.31 0.66 0.91 0.87 0.39 1.22 -0.33 0.83 0.62 0.36
P0.05 1.19 0.80 1.51 1.32 0.86 1.66 2.10 1.33 0.62 0.56
P0.25 1.36 0.95 1.21 0.82 0.91 1.66 2.68 1.29 0.58 0.86
P0.50 1.09 0.75 0.86 0.55 0.68 1.16 1.29 0.87 0.35 0.79
P0.75 0.80 0.52 0.59 0.40 0.52 0.77 0.88 0.61 0.23 0.59
P0.95 0.49 0.17 0.20 0.11 0.20 0.29 0.40 0.21 0.04 0.18
P0.99 0.18 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.03
Age
OLS 1.30 1.93 0.34 2.14 1.45 1.53 2.21 1.52 1.59 1.79
P0.01 -0.15 0.18 -0.70 0.04 -0.09 -0.32 -0.36 -0.02 0.48 0.12
P0.05 0.17 0.85 -0.10 0.94 0.80 -0.38 0.80 0.48 0.72 0.50
P0.25 0.39 1.70 0.28 2.31 1.10 0.42 2.77 1.55 1.92 0.84
P0.50 1.09 2.39 0.46 2.45 1.91 1.31 2.75 1.91 0.45 1.97
P0.75 1.98 2.67 1.24 1.66 2.53 2.21 2.05 1.99 0.10 1.73
P0.95 1.10 1.04 0.43 0.32 1.27 0.61 1.08 0.78 -0.14 -0.18
P0.99 0.29 0.24 0.01 0.04 0.33 0.00 0.42 0.16 -0.07 -0.33
Age2
OLS -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
P0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
P0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00
P0.25 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
P0.50 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
P0.75 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
P0.95 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
P0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female
OLS -2.77 -3.64 -0.18 1.46 -2.07 -1.12 -11.17 -6.44 -1.45 -0.81
P0.01 0.15 -0.78 -3.36 0.07 -0.36 -0.93 -1.08 -1.62 -4.73 0.67
P0.05 -1.22 -3.30 -3.22 -0.78 -1.24 -1.46 -1.91 -4.67 -0.98 0.34
P0.25 -1.93 -5.26 -1.06 -1.15 -2.91 -0.01 -10.19 -9.57 -2.88 1.02
P0.50 -2.02 -4.38 -1.18 0.12 -3.04 0.22 -12.51 -7.80 2.44 0.07
P0.75 -2.45 -1.49 0.12 -0.35 -2.09 -2.15 -9.13 -5.32 1.03 -1.13
P0.95 -1.41 -0.63 1.24 -0.46 -0.45 -2.19 -1.96 -1.31 1.94 1.29
P0.99 0.08 -0.16 0.28 -0.10 0.09 -0.79 -0.42 -0.32 -0.19 -0.61
Source: HFCS 2010, own calculations. The table shows the parameter estimates of OLS and quantile regressions at
the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentile. Estimates with an associated p–value below 0.01 are depicted in bold,
values below 0.05 in italics. Insignificant estimates (p–value above 0.05) are given in gray.
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Table A.2: (continued)
AT BE DE ES FR GR NL PT SI SK
Entrepreneur
OLS 17.29 13.47 6.88 10.72 21.47 8.48 6.45 13.52 26.29 5.76
P0.01 1.08 5.88 -6.35 4.51 11.42 -1.34 -0.27 5.00 16.53 2.82
P0.05 8.45 4.60 5.12 11.61 19.58 3.74 0.12 8.96 8.39 1.72
P0.25 10.29 12.20 5.72 10.92 18.66 8.23 8.99 14.88 5.79 1.29
P0.50 14.42 13.73 7.18 11.61 21.26 11.30 7.06 15.55 13.03 8.37
P0.75 14.33 14.29 7.63 8.68 20.20 6.84 9.68 13.97 24.30 6.27
P0.95 10.53 6.92 4.75 2.92 9.15 2.12 4.76 5.55 15.53 2.28
P0.99 2.92 1.07 1.32 0.37 2.50 1.29 2.63 2.09 6.76 -0.06
Tertiary Education
OLS -0.01 7.45 3.49 6.11 4.46 4.59 6.64 9.77 14.52 9.70
P0.01 -0.23 3.77 -2.41 3.62 1.26 0.73 1.46 0.26 2.95 0.13
P0.05 2.89 5.65 1.06 10.57 6.30 1.60 4.33 11.60 8.81 1.77
P0.25 1.83 6.32 1.66 11.43 3.87 2.46 9.22 17.48 18.60 7.67
P0.50 1.16 6.09 1.84 10.20 3.09 5.54 7.74 12.94 16.76 11.99
P0.75 -2.20 5.78 1.51 6.88 3.26 6.17 6.36 10.37 9.27 9.91
P0.95 -0.99 2.87 1.50 1.78 2.74 2.85 3.01 5.42 5.21 3.54
P0.99 1.75 1.05 0.46 0.40 1.11 1.48 1.18 1.23 5.31 1.35
Retiree
OLS 1.95 5.77 3.53 2.73 5.53 4.67 -4.56 0.58 20.18 -2.90
P0.01 -0.52 1.98 5.69 0.17 0.93 -0.50 -1.70 -1.00 12.69 -0.24
P0.05 1.55 6.57 8.80 -0.98 0.99 0.14 -0.76 -0.10 13.71 0.08
P0.25 2.15 12.67 3.35 2.55 8.11 4.13 3.07 -0.34 13.40 -11.29
P0.50 3.53 7.06 4.56 3.36 5.39 6.83 -2.69 3.05 15.93 -2.85
P0.75 0.48 0.73 3.87 1.38 2.53 1.87 -1.27 2.33 5.50 0.58
P0.95 -0.16 3.95 1.37 0.08 0.75 -0.21 -0.51 -0.82 0.41 -1.94
P0.99 0.03 2.12 0.19 0.03 0.15 -1.59 0.53 -1.22 -0.84 -3.78
Source: HFCS 2010, own calculations. The table shows the parameter estimates of OLS and quantile regressions at
the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentile. Estimates with an associated p–value below 0.01 are depicted in bold,
values below 0.05 in italics. Insignificant estimates (p–value above 0.05) are given in gray.
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Table A.3: Ratios between inheritance and income coefficients
AT BE DE ES FR GR NL PT SI SK
Bequest (Yes/No)
OLS 49.1 27.4 39.7 29.6 34.9 42.7 65.1 38.7 33.9 18.3
P01 40.8 55.0 54.9 70.3 72.3 542.1 158.0 748.7 133.7 60.9
P05 52.2 38.4 47.2 38.2 44.9 212.5 61.7 104.7 69.4 46.5
P25 56.6 28.3 35.0 21.9 37.9 85.2 49.3 48.2 39.5 37.1
P50 50.5 27.6 30.1 23.2 36.2 41.7 38.8 31.9 23.9 29.0
P75 41.0 28.5 28.2 33.4 46.5 31.1 57.2 30.0 20.8 27.2
P95 49.8 34.1 41.1 51.6 76.8 34.2 75.3 37.0 35.5 15.4
P99 66.6 24.3 31.4 62.0 92.0 24.2 33.6 62.2 33.4 4.5
Bequest (CDF)
OLS 2.8 1.8 2.4 2.2 1.8 3.0 13.0 2.9 1.3 1.5
P01 12.8 9.4 7.3 7.1 6.3 44.9 76.2 228.4 2.6 12.2
P05 6.2 3.4 5.0 3.9 3.5 13.9 31.9 10.2 1.8 5.2
P25 3.8 2.2 2.4 1.7 2.2 7.1 9.8 3.5 1.3 3.4
P50 2.8 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.7 2.9 5.9 2.0 0.8 2.1
P75 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.8 1.9 1.9 7.9 2.0 0.6 1.4
P95 2.0 2.0 1.8 2.4 2.5 1.8 10.5 2.0 0.3 0.9
P99 2.7 1.8 1.6 3.0 2.9 1.4 5.8 2.5 0.8 0.4
Source: HFCS 2010, own calculations. The table shows the ratios of inheritance and income parameter estimates of
OLS and quantile regressions at the 1st, 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 95th and 99th percentile.
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